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necessary monopoly of the monistic epistemology. Common sense, for example, holds that we know directly the very stars and stones themselves, and not mere ideas of them, and it holds that the very same stars and stones that we know do persist unchanged through the hours when we know them not. And could we but solve or postpone the baffling problem of the material mechanism which enables us, in the acts of perception and thought, invisibly to reproject into the transsubjective sphere the objective *quales* previously projected thence upon our sense organs as visible or measurable energy modes, it would be as easy and natural to believe that our sight extended through external space and grasped the real stars as that our hands extend through external space and grasp the real chairs and tables.

Presentative or monistic realism, which might be named 'pan-objectivism' to distinguish it both from dualism and from thoroughgoing idealism or pan-subjectivism, is, in short, by no means self-contradictory, though it is in modern philosophy much less frequently defended, and much more difficult to defend, than the dualistic form of realism. The idealist should not, then, regard a refutation of dualism as equivalent to a refutation of realism. If all of the three dualisms which we have been discussing, viz., psychophysical, metaphysical and epistemological, were abandoned, it would still be possible to hold with the realist that the objects known are not dependent for their existence on the knower, and that consciousness, during the brief moments of its life, expands so as to encircle the things distant in space and time, rather than that the latter contract into mere ideas or states of mind. To say with the idealist that the universe that is known is as small as the knower, is not the same as to say with the monistic realist that the knower can become, while he knows, as large as the universe which he knows. In the one case we insult the universe by reducing it to the dependent status of our own feelings, in the other we console ourselves for the temporary and intermittent nature of our consciousness by the thought that while it lasts it can take us out beyond ourselves into the realm of things that endure.

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DISCUSSION

A REPLY TO MR. PITKIN

MR. PITKIN'S 'reply' to me, on page 44 of the present volume, perplexes me by the obscurity of style which I find in almost all our younger philosophers. He asks me, however, two direct questions which I understand, so I take the liberty of answering.

First he asks: Do not experience and science show 'that countless

things are¹ experienced *as* that which they are not or are only partially.' I reply: Yes, assuredly, as, for example, 'things' distorted by refractive media, 'molecules,' or whatever else is taken to be more ultimately real than the immediate content of the perceptive moment.

Secondly: "If experience is self-supporting (in *any* intelligible sense) does this fact preclude the possibility of (a) something not experienced and (b) action of experience upon a noumenon?"

My reply is: Assuredly not the possibility of either—how could it? Yet in my opinion we should be wise not to *consider* any thing or action of that nature, and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to what is experienced or, at least, experientiable.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Philosophy of Goethe's Faust. THOMAS DAVIDSON. Edited by Charles M. Bakewell. Boston: Ginn & Co. 1906. Pp. iv + 158.

As the editor's preface informs us, this small volume contains six lectures delivered by the late Mr. Davidson in 1896. They are intended 'to lay bare the philosophical and ethical skeleton' of Goethe's 'Faust.' This is done in a running commentary, which tells the story in outline, and intersperses observations on the moral of various passages and on the view of life presented in the whole poem. "'Faust' has an obvious content"—the "emancipation of the individual from institutionalism" (p. 3). "After many abortive attempts . . . the long-suppressed Germanic spirit broke the chains which bound it, asserting itself in its true character. 'Faust' is the drama of this movement; of the escape of the German from the controlling influences of Judea, Greece and Rome" (p. 5). "This movement has two fairly well-defined sides, . . . both essentially Germanic, for the individualistic element in Italy is all Germanic. . . . The Teuton seeks intellectual, the Italian moral freedom. . . . Inasmuch, then, as the Germanic movement includes these two sides, they are both taken account of by Goethe in his poem. 'Faust' is the embodiment of the tendency as a whole" (p. 52).

Goethe's 'aim in the whole work is to show the process by which the individual rises to autonomy.' "When Faust started out and made the pact with Mephistopheles, his notion was, through sensational, boisterous experience, to widen his self out to the limit of humanity's self. Now [in the second part] his purpose is 'to struggle ever onward to the highest existence.' This is a very great change, a change from quantity to quality. Faust has learned . . . that the sum of humanity is a very different thing from the highest existence, which may often be best reached by avoiding a very large amount of experience" (p. 73).

¹ Mr. Pitkin inserts the clause: 'by reason of the very nature of experience itself.' Not understanding just what reason is meant, I do not include this clause in my answer.